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Subjects Files,  
1916-1973

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Detailed comments  
of seniors member,  
Board of Review,  
Naval War College,  
Battle of Savo Island

0190

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Detailed comments of the Board of Review  
on  
"Battle of Savo Island".

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

BA:hjs  
9 Jan 1950

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From: Senior Member of the Board of Review, "Battle of Savo Island."  
To: President, Naval War College  
Subj: Report on the publication "Battle of Savo Island" prepared by the Department of Analysis.  
Encl: (1) Detailed comments of the Board of Review, "Battle of Savo Island."

1. The Board of Review, consisting of Captains Bern Anderson, H. D. Felt, J.C.S. McKillip, F.L. Tedder and R.H. Taylor, has reviewed the subject publication and each member has prepared his own notes and comments as a result of such study. The Board's detailed comments and notes have been consolidated and are submitted as enclosure (1).

2. The consensus of the Board is that this publication, in the present form, should be considered as a first draft. This draft requires extensive editing, revision, and condensation, before it will be ready for publication. In making this statement, the Board realizes that the amount of work which has gone into the preparation of this book is tremendous, both as to the sources investigated and as to the scope of the analysis. The narrative is most complete and the diagrams are excellent. A great deal of work has obviously gone into the fitting together of bits of information derived of U.S., Japanese, and Australian sources.

3. The strongest impression received from studying this analysis is that there was a complete lack of readiness for action in the Allied Forces. In fact every lesson or incident of the action comes back to this basic point; our Commanders were apparently not conditioned or ready to fight a night action. It seems incredible that, after eight months of war, this condition could exist. That it did suggests two major questions:

a. When a representative cross-section of our high ranking officers displayed this lack of leadership, it suggests that there was something radically wrong with our whole pre-war system of training and selecting officers for high command. The question raised is -- What was wrong?

b. The existence of this condition suggests that there may be other material, as yet undiscovered, unavailable, or

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unused, that would assist in understanding what happened and why. The large amount of conjectural discussion on what might have influenced various Commanders in reaching their decisions or indecisions also suggests that there may have been other pertinent factors relating to the battle, information of which may never become available for this analysis. The question is -- How much conjecture should be included in this analysis?

4. The redundancy of the words "appears" and "must", in such expressions as "it appears that he felt", "it must have occurred to him", "he must have thought", etc., detracts from the analysis. In most cases where this device has been used, the Board feels that, had this idea occurred to the Commander concerned at the time, his subsequent action probably would have been different from that which he did or did not take. This policy is closely related to the use of the literary device of trying to enter into the Commander's mind to see what thoughts might have occurred to him. While it is believed that an analysis of this kind requires some such speculation as to the reasoning which led to decisions or to lack of decisions, it is believed that in each case it should be clearly indicated that this is what is being done. Two suggestions for handling this device are offered:

a. When attempting to analyze a Commander's thoughts an assumption should introduce the thought processes, e.g., "If the Commander Chicago Group recognized the condition - - - - he might have reasoned something like this:"

b. When it is desirable to examine the thoughts or possible thoughts of a Commander the text should be broken distinctly by a paragraph labelled "DISCUSSION". Somewhere in the analysis, possibly in the Foreword, it should be clearly indicated that such discussions are the result of extensive and detailed studies, at the Naval War College, of events that actually took place over a period of an hour or two of actual time.

5. The general subject of Damage Control and of Communications are touched rather lightly in the analysis. The tactical maneuvers of each ship are covered in great detail, as is the use of gun fire. The failure of communications or the failure to use existing communication systems, are frequently mentioned but the reasons for these are not brought out. Members of the Board in discussing this subject with Commander Knoertzer, who was in the San Juan Group in the Buchanan, and Commander Craighill, who was in the Blue, found that both officers indicate that the destroyers present did not have a complete list of the voice calls of the ships present. Commander Wirtz, who was in the

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Zane, states that his ship did have a complete call list. The communications system in use at the time had voice calls consisting of nicknames and these officers indicate that the whole communications organization was very loose. With respect to Damage Control, the analysis apparently accepts at face value the reports of damage and sinking conditions of the ships concerned. As a result of their studies, the members of the Board feel that had the Damage Control Organizations on the various ships been functioning properly, the heavy losses sustained might have been substantially reduced. The Board feels that this subject is important enough to receive considerable attention in an analysis of this scope.

6. The Board believes that the battle lessons are generally excellent and each member has a number of individual comments on the arrangements or other details of the various lessons in enclosure (1). The Board also believes that at least four additional battle lessons should be included. These are:


a. The Theater Commander should have complete operational control over the communication facilities within his Command.

b. The importance of damage control training in Allied ships.

c. The importance of adequate training in identification of ships at night.

d. The need for having a mobile logistics support group sufficiently near to permit sustained operations in the combat area, including the maintenance of control of the air.

7. The opinions of individual members of the Board vary as to the effort and length of time required to edit this analysis for publication. These estimates vary from three to six months.

  
BERN ANDERSON.

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DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE PUBLICATION

"BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND"

General:

In the comments on the pages following, frequent use of the expression "I question this" has been made. In a few cases this refers to the accuracy or soundness of the statement cited, but in most cases it is intended to mean that the statement cited impresses a member of the Board as not entirely appropriate or that it does not seem to be supported by the accompanying discussion.

The "Battle of Savo Island" is very revealing. Although somewhat detailed, it is exceptionally well done from a "what actually happened" standpoint. Many of the philosophical comments are excellent but then again there are a few that leave one with the impression that it "wasn't that way at all" and that "something is still missing".

The narrative is most complete and the diagrams are excellent. A great deal of work has gone into the fitting of bits of information, from United States, Japanese and Australian sources, into a complete whole. The outline and table of contents indicate that the book is well arranged.

The one major lesson that stands out above all else is the astounding fact that officer training is probably still lamentably deficient.

The addition of some or all of the following would improve the narrative and aid the reader:

1. A Table of Contents. (Copy prepared by a member of the Board is attached).
2. Japanese and Allied Command Diagrams.
3. A Diagram showing the means and methods of handling communications between SOPAC and SOWESPAC.
4. A tabulation of opposing forces in the area and those likely to be moved into the area, would improve the picture if added near page 86.
5. Diagram covering movements of CHICAGO, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA, BAGLEY and PATTERSON after 0150 would help the reader visualize the situation at this time.

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Enclosure (1)

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6. Identifying data on ship and group movements shown on the Composite Chart.

Following expressions appear frequently:

"appears to"

"presumably"

"seems to have"

"must have been"

"it is probable"

"it is apparent"

"it is not considered"

"it therefore seems profitable"

"must have known"

"must have realized"

"it seems extremely doubtful"

"it seems clear"

"does not appear to have"

"was presumably due to"

"should therefore have received"

"it would seem"

"it seems highly probable"

"it is quite possible"

"it appears profitable to speculate"

"must have appreciated"

"perhaps he desired to"

"was apt to have".

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U.S.S. HELM should be criticized for closing own CA's so close at 0204. It is hard to understand how the HELM almost ran into the WILSON which ship was then engaged with the enemy using her five inch battery. This appears to have been another case of "too much sightseeing". But for the alertness of the WILSON, there would have been a serious collision.

Movements of the U.S.S. MACKINAC on the 6th and 7th are not shown on the diagram. During this period, text relates that she moved from Noumea to Marmasike.

The use of letter abbreviations in many cases will be quite confusing in the not too distant future. In each case they should be explained, i.e. LB-30, V.F. IFF, etc.

The following questions have not been answered:

1. Did all units have a common, fast reporting contact code and had a common voice call list been promulgated, or was this done by visual means for each operation and included only those vessels in a particular force or group?
2. Did Australian vessels have TBS and other voice tactical and reporting channels? Did they only have the "TBY" battery powered receivers and transmitters which by their very nature could only be used intermittently?
3. Just what orders had been issued to the BLUE and RALPH TALBOT concerning their duties the night of the Battle?
4. Why was the fueling rendezvous for the Fast Carriers so far away from the Objective Area?

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"THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND"

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\*Note: Not Numbered.

DIAGRAMS:

- "A" -- Area of Operations
- "B" -- Air Searches - 6 August.  
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- "C" -- Air Searches and Movement of Forces - 7 August.
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- "E" -- Japanese Approach Past Radar Pickets - 0045-0132,  
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- "F" -- Action with the Chicago Group - 0130-0150, 9 August.
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- "I" -- Withdrawal of Japanese Force, 0216-0240, 9 August.
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(Detailed Comments - Cont'd.)

FOREWORD

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1	1	"Prepared by the Naval War College" should be changed to ".....under the auspices of the ....."
1	--	"Viewpoint of the Commander" should be changed to "Viewpoint of the Commanders of the units involved."
2	4 - <u>line 3</u>	"improved" when? - during the course of the war?
2	-- <u>line 5</u>	Insert -- between "Commander" and "was relearned".

General:

1. Numbering the paragraphs gives an initial impression of amateurism.

2. The first two paragraphs should be combined with a "However."

3. Paragraph 5 should be deleted as having no bearing on the subject.

4. Pages are numbered incorrectly.

CHAPTER I.

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1	--	2nd line from bottom.	Question phrase "the limited potential of Japan".
			On "Area Chart" - "Rabaul" is spelled incorrectly.
1		next to last line.	Change "affect" to "effect".
2	2	4	"permanently?"
3	--	1	Should "Buka" be "Buna"?

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CHAPTER I (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
4	--	4	After "Florida Island" should be inserted "which became known among Allied forces as Iron Bottom Sound."
7		Last two lines.	Starts at 2330 and clears at 2200. Should 2200 not be 0200?
7	Last Paragraph	--	Question the feasibility of using the expression, "Apparently every night of the year".
7	--	Last line.	Local time should be indicated here. A statement should be made that all times are local unless otherwise indicated.

General:

1. Why all the verbiage on weather? That existing at the time of the Battle is all that is pertinent.
2. Asterisks are not professional means of an author citing his authorities.

CHAPTER II

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
8, Part 1.	--	--	Delete "Which was."
8 & 9	--	--	Entirely too much verbiage: pages 8 and 9 could be deleted down to last paragraph of page 9.
9	Top of page		Was the buildup due to a defense objective? It seems more likely that it was due to planned offensive operations. True, operations gradually became defensive in nature. Here, we are involved with the philosophy of the Japanese high command. It seems a little early in the war

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CHAPTER II (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
9	Top of page		to say that the Japanese were planning defensively at this point, despite the fact that the Coral Sea Battle had stalemated their drive towards Australia for the time being.
11	1	--	The presumption in the last sentence of the 1st paragraph adds nothing and should be deleted.
11	2	1	Is it "MAKAWA" or "MIKAWA"?
11	Bottom of page		"twenty-four hours after he left Rabaul" -- there is no orienting time handy to this statement with the result that the statement becomes a little obscure.
12,24,90,92,99, and 108		--	DD Yunagi became Yukaze without explanation. Really remained Yunagi.
12	3	--	"numerous weaknesses" - this has not been shown so far, except by inference. Suggest this statement be deleted and/or the whole paragraph be rewritten.
12	4	--	This paragraph could be improved if a sentence were added -- "Many details were missing as will be pointed out later."
13	1 & 2	--	So far there has been no justification of most of the statements contained herein.
13	3	--	What is the meaning of "including converted"?
15	--	1	Caps SOPAC.
15	--	--	Too much detail on fighters. This could be condensed.

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CHAPTER II (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
16	--	--	No justification is shown for the positive statement as to the Commander's plans.
17	2	Last line.	Insert "air" before "activity".
15-19	--	--	<u>Japanese Land and Tender Based Aircraft</u> -- What does this section have to do specifically with the Battle of Savo? Here again the issue is confused by spreading out too broadly. This book is <u>not</u> an analysis of the Solomons Campaign.
18	2	--	This paragraph repeats a statement made earlier.
18	Bottom of page		"casual" is a little strong in characterization.
18	--	--	See no connection between this analysis and the comment on Army airplanes. Believe the latter part of the sentence is adequate explanation - (casual manner of conducting searches) - if this true, what is the source? See page 20.
20	1	4	"casual" (same as page 18, para.2).
20	2	--	"Casual" again. How about a synonym?
20	--	--	What justifies the conclusion that "searches must have been casual"? 2nd para. seems to explain the failure to detect the amphibious movement.
20-22	--	--	<u>Japanese Search and Reconnaissance-</u> Several pages of material pertinent to the "Occupation of Guadalcanal," but extraneous to the "Battle of Savo Island."

CHAPTER II (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
21	--	2	"unfavorable .....(but)....not unsatisfactory"; Current aerological terminology classifies weather as "undesirable" and "bad".
21	2	--	"developing situation" - How about "Capabilities of the Allied Forces" instead?
22 and vicinity		--	Jap Air Searches and comments questionable.
22	5th line from bottom		Do not consider the question is logical. It seems to assume too much.
22	5th line from bottom		My answer to this question is "no". For the next sentence see page 14.
15-23	--	--	Believe that sections on Jap air should be reworked and condensed to eliminate repetitions, contradictions, and to clarify.
23	--	--	Although the Japanese use and employment of their aircraft is, according to present day standards, questionable it is believed that the last sentence on this subject which is located at the top of page 23 should be deleted.
23	--	--	Jap Commander left Rabaul on 1 Aug.? Page 11 indicates he left on 7 August. (3rd line from bottom and 2nd para.). Jap ships to Kavieng - page 24 indicates that none were at Kavieng.
23	5th line from top		Question words, "Southwest Area".
25	3	6	"own" (?) change to "their own"(?).
25	--	--	Bottom para on feasibility - I question this.

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CHAPTER II (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
26	Top of page		Is this assuming too much?
26	7th line from bottom		Should "do not" be "did not"? This whole page seems to be an attempt to divine Japanese thinking.
27	--	--	Repeats information already given.
27	2	--	Jap Admiral was earlier stated to have believed an Allied raid in the Solomons was pending.  Believe the section on the Jap situation and plans should be revised. Are not the Jap Commander's plans or orders available for reference and citing?
27-28	--	--	<u>Japanese Plan</u> -- Is it necessary to go into the complete plan for defense of the Outer South Seas Area in order to set the scene for Savo?
28	10th line from bottom		Should this be Outer South Seas Force?

Recapitulation:

This Chapter should stick to the subject.

CHAPTER III

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
29-36	--	--	A lot of this is extraneous to the problem at hand.  It is not good taste for the author to promote himself in the footnotes.

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CHAPTER III (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
29a	--	17	"United Nations" might be confusing.
30	--	--	Tasks of Comsopac are taken from a lecture - original order containing these should be available.
31	--	3	"United Nations" might be confusing.
33	--	6	Basic mission: "Seize ...Tulagi". This is not consistent with Comsopac tasks on pages 29a and 30.
34	--	--	Organization hard to visualize; a diagram would help this section considerably.
35	--	--	Don't get the drift too clearly at the bottom of the page.
35	--	--	Task organization numbers do not seem to jibe with present thinking.
35	--	--	Admiral McCain's command - extent not clear. It should be stated that this command included all land-based and tender-based aircraft in SOPAC.
36	--	4	"Supreme tactical command within the landing force". This should be checked since "Expeditionary Force" is correct - "Landing Force" is a troop element. On the diversity of titles - Good order writing should have them having only one title for this operation, e.g., CTF 61, 62 & 63. Others are administrative titles which should not appear in the body of the orders.

CONFIDENTIALCHAPTER III (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
36	4th line from top		Should "landing Force" be "expeditionary force"? Remainder of this paragraph is questionable. Review next paragraph.
36-40	--	--	Information available to Allied Commanders CTF 62 and CTF 61 Op plans are cited as sources - should not the Allied commander be the basic source?
37	2nd line from top		"intelligence" might mean "information".
37	1	Last sentence	Is this correct in view of previous discussion?
37	1	Last sentence	Poor - either this sentence should be written something like this -- "It is apparent that intelligence available concerning these airfields and seaplane bases was far from adequate," or the sentence should be deleted since the subsequent paragraph furnishes some further details.
40 to 41	--	--	Should logistic support forces be indicated in "Allied Dispositions"?
42-52	--	--	<u>Allied Land and Tender Based Aircraft</u> -- Entirely too much trivia. This can and should be condensed at least 50%.
43a	<u>TABLE I</u>		Headings of some columns confusion between "squadrons" or "planes", or "aircraft".
44	1	--	Believe effective bombing radius of B-17 should be carefully checked.
44	2	5	Change "furthest" to "most".
45	2	1	Should MACKINAC be included here?

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CHAPTER III (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
45	2nd line from bottom		"4F4-3P" should be "F4F-3P".  What about the F4F-3As mentioned in previous paragraph?
45	--	--	I question the title "Naval Air Force". Should it be "Shore and Tender Based"?
46	--	3	Should "P-400's" be "P-40's"?
46	1	Last line.	31 B-17's seems like a small number for the total of 4 squadrons.
46	2	Last 2 sentences.	First sentence doesn't make sense; the second is an assumption.
46	2	--	What is the authority for the statement "forerunner of Strategic Bombing Command - 20th A.F."?  Last sentence of this paragraph is unnecessary.
46	3	--	Mention of losses is unnecessary at this point.
47	1	3 & 4	Mention of losses is unnecessary here.
47	2	--	Do not believe it necessary to go into material defects here.
48	2	First two lines.	Delete.
49 & 50	--	--	Too much detail.
50	--	5th line from bottom.	Substitute "was" for "were".  Next to "He" (who?). last line.

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CHAPTER III (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
51	2	Last sentence.	Delete "and".
51	Bottom of page.		Repeats material on 49 and 50.
52	2	5	"where" should be "from whence" or "from which location."
53	--	12	Question use of word "apparently".
54	--	--	What are diagrams B-1 and B-2?
55	--	4	"p-15" ?
55	6th line from bottom.		Change "CTF 6" to "CTF 61".
56	1	10	"landing attack" should be "landing" or "assault".
56	2	--	This statement appears to ignore the fact that the searches covered, for the most part, surface ship approach.
56	2	--	An assumption?
57	7th line from bottom.		Sentence should begin "Commencing Aug. 5th .....".
57	--	--	Reader's attention should be directed to Diagram C somewhere on page 57.
59	--	--	Is 2nd paragraph necessary? Too much presumption in last paragraph!
59	--	--	Criticism of the order "to be prepared to strike" does not seem justified under the circumstances. It would appear that even the faintest "alert" is not only desired by a commander but can be made very useful in that preliminary preparations, even to briefing, can be undertaken. The least that can be accomplished in this

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CHAPTER III (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
59	--	--	case would be preliminary work and planning as to plane loadings, method of attack, coordination, target studies, etc.
59	2	--	To me "be prepared to strike hostile naval targets" means to be armed with proper bombs, etc., in case targets of opportunity develop. I doubt the soundness of this paragraph (See para. 2, Page 62).
59	6th line from bottom.		Was not 158E the limiting boundary of SOWESPAC?
61	1	--	Question.  This is a battle lesson before we come to the battle. It would seem more appropriate to cover the point that no provision was made to intensify the searches while the Allied Forces were in the Objective Area. This seems strange since the enemy had a definite capability of surface force retaliation, etc.
62	--	--	Question the validity of the statement in the last two lines.
62	3	--	Conclusions are again stated here and we are still in an introductory phase.
63	--	--	What connection does the rehearsal at Koro Island have with the Battle of Savo?
63	3	--	Repeats what is on page 35.
64	2	Bottom	Change "mental processes" to "actions" (we don't know what his mental processes were).
64	--	--	Is it necessary to give <u>all</u> the details of fueling?

CHAPTER III (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
65	--	14	" " not understood.
65	--	--	The approach to the Solomons is not pertinent to Savo, and the conclusion arrived at on page 65 contributes little if anything.
66	1	--	Do not agree - believe carriers were as vital at this point. I believe this paragraph could be rewritten to good advantage.
68	--	--	One point is forgotten. Also, the efficiency of the interception of attacking planes by the CAP improved, allowing relatively fewer to penetrate the surface disposition.
68	--	--	The reasoning on page 68 is faulty. The reason for separation of carriers was to give air groups <u>air space</u> for rendezvous and break-up. As to defense, the lesson had not yet been learned that fighter defense is made easier by concentrating ships and controlling a spot defense rather than dispersing and wasting fighter strength to defend separated targets. When that lesson was learned, carriers were pulled into a correlated task group, and pilots had to develop techniques of operating in tight and sometimes confused patterns. Ship maneuverability and AA gunfire defense had absolutely nothing to do with this. All of this is, however, entirely extraneous to the Battle of Savo.
70-72	--	--	What does the Attack Force Approach Disposition have to do with Savo?
74	2	--	At this point it would be interesting to know what the SS Commander's orders <u>were</u> .

CHAPTER III (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comments</u>
73-74	--	--	What part did the subs have in Savo action? Reporting enemy movements? or independent patrol?
74	--	--	On page 74 we finally get down to cases.
79	--	--	Why cite a lecture for this data? Do not the orders show this?
Tasks Assigned and Composition of Forces.			Too much detail.
79	--	--	Citation on page 79 not best authority; can be obtained from Official Battle Reports.
80	Middle of page.		Intelligence indicates no Jap surface forces in the area - see 2nd para., page 56 - why did the planning not take into account the possibility of surface attack?
82	--	--	Much repetition here.
83-85	--	--	<u>American Plan</u> -- Setting forth the entire plan for occupation of Solomons is not necessary.
85	--	17	Change "counter-enemy".
86	3	--	"he" should be qualified.
86	Top of page.		Believe this preliminary discussion could be condensed for clarity.
86	Top of page.		Para. at top of page.

Recapitulation:

Condense, stick to the subject.

CHAPTER IV

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comments</u>
88	--	10	Add diagram no. ____.
89	11th line from bottom.		Assumptions.
91	--	--	Times are confusing - what Zone Descriptions?
92	1	--	Misleading about departure Rabaul.
92	--	--	Assembling cruiser force in Rabaul - compare this with dispositions on page 23.
93	Bottom of page.		"Discovery of this force" ? Should this not be "to report all forces in the area?"
94	Middle of page.		How could the Jap admiral have weighed TF 61.1 if he did not know of its presence?
94	1	Last sentence.	Unusual wording.
95,96,& 97	--	--	Reference to raids is made by time of arrival might be a bit more accurate using exact time of initial attacks.
96	--	--	Paragraph on Jap Commander should be compared with the Jap organization at the beginning of the analysis.

General:

Now the author, after a confusing profusion of background, starts to cook. From here on the book is excellent.

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CHAPTER V

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comments</u>
101	--	--	H-hours at bottom of page?
102	--	--	question last sentence.
103	--	--	Repetition of attacks and damage to Mugford.
103	--	2	Delete "and" add "etc" after Two Jima.
104	1	--	It might be desirable here to add the reason or reasons why no night searches were or could be made at that time for when this book is used in the future the question of night searches will certainly come up.
105	Paragraph at top of page.		Assumption.
105	--	12	Insert plate no. if any.
109	2	--	Does 2nd paragraph agree with discussion above regarding night action.
109	Line 3 from bottom.		Delete entire last sentence.
110	--	--	"the old story of not enough DDs", and some useless employment of light craft to protect larger vessels in the vicinity. Later on in the war in the Pacific it was found that the proper and most economical method to screen such an area was to cover the entrances well and carefully with ample DD or smaller types and if not enough light screening vessels were available in the covering force to deplete the transport screen in order to have suitable and completely reliable coverage. As I remember conditions at this stage of the last war and

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CHAPTER V (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comments</u>
110	--	--	considering the ability of lookouts, the presence of blue rather than red lights about ship during darkened conditions, the proficiency of radar and radar operators, the absence of a CIC or COC and the emphasis on Sonar; it was normal for the DD sonar operator to pick up targets on a dark night before other means did so. The BLUE had only two radars, the SC (or Air Search) and the FD (or fire control).
110	--	10	"duel" should be "drill".
110	1	--	Last sentence - poor. A better sentence would be - "Also, it appears that ample time was available for appropriate tactical exercises while in the vicinity of Koro Island and while en route to the Objective."
113	9th line from bottom.		"Comdr. Vincennes group apparently knew of Australia group plans for the night" - See p. 109, 6th line from bottom - Vincennes group did not know of other groups plans.
114a	Last sentence on page.		Assumption?
114a-115	--	--	Do not see that comparison with Leyte Gulf adds to this discussion (No intelligence at Savo, vs good intelligence at Leyte Gulf).
115	--	--	Omit note.
117(b)	--	7	Add diagram no. ____.
117(c)	2	--	At about 1742 "appears to have intercepted a message". Did he actually intercept it?

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CHAPTER V (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comments</u>
117(c)	3	last sentence.	Isn't this statement premature?
118	--	4 & 5	Believe CAP should be inserted after words "low" and "high".
118	3	--	Approves CTG 61.1 choice of operating areas. On page 117 CTF 61 is criticised for launching carrier search from south of Cape Henslow. These should be harmonized.
118	--	12	Add diagram no. ____.
123(b)	--	--	Not understood.
124	--	8	Would it be better to change "correct" to "assigned"?
124-125	--	--	Question the value of this discussion.
125	--	5	Change "by" to "of".
125	--	--	More emphasis should be placed here on the inadequacy of the communication set up in the theater and between adjacent commands. The outcome would have been different had more initial planning been given to this always deficient and often neglected problem of communications.

General:

It seems to be that a form could be adopted of first, setting forth the situation and then, making the Analysis.

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CC [REDACTED]

## CHAPTER VI

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comments</u>
126	6th line from bottom.		Change "southwesterly" to "southeasterly".
126	--	14	Words "and confident" appear incorrect here.
128	2	--	"No combat air patrols flown". Did the Jap cruisers have fighters?
130	--	4	Why this is incorrect is not indicated. Enemy planes in contact at 1020 & 1105. Also see next sentence. See also p. 169b.
130	2	--	Delete last sentence.
134	--	7	What is "AKITSUSHIMA"?
138 (and bottom p. 137)			CTF 62 reported blue skys all day - planes were in the target area about 1130 - line 5 not understood.
141	--	--	I-122 on chart reads I-123 -- should be corrected to read I-122.

## CHAPTER VII

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comments</u>
145	2	1	We need a new expression for "mental processes" - this is being over-worked. How about "running estimate of the situation" or "thinking"?
145	--	1-4	It appears that the report on SS at 1127 was reasonably correct from page 141 concerning SS I-121. However, Long. 159-07E was in error. Rewrite first half of page 145.

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CHAPTER VII (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
145-148	--	--	Believe Admiral Turner's own ideas, rather than what he appears to have thought, would strengthen this.
149	6th line from bottom.		Question the necessity of this sentence.
149	--	--	C.O. CHICAGO knew that CTG 62.6 would probably be away all night - On p. 148, CTG 62.6 advised C.O. CHICAGO he did not know he would return to the formation that night. Also see line 15.
154	--	--	Message quoted to COMSOPAC also quoted on p. 144.
154	8th line from bottom.		Succeeding discussion justifies cutting out "to endeavor to analyze the mental processes of CTF 61."
154	3	--	"Mental processes" again.
160	Middle paragraph.	--	See also comment on p. 118.
161	--	20	Add diagram no. ____.
163	--	15	Sub must have been the I-122 for as previously stated I-123 was en route Truk to Rabaul or Tulagi unless it had already reached Rabaul.
163	--	--	Were U.S. subs informed of developments; landings; etc.; or were they operating independently?
164	--	12	Add diagram no. ____.
166	8th line from bottom.		Should "CTF 62's" be "CTF 61's"?
168	12th line from bottom.		Do not like the remainder of this paragraph.

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CHAPTER VII (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
168	--	4	Why "this seems so, for ...."?
169-170	--	--	Why the reports were so confusing is not very clearly developed.

CHAPTER VIII

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
171	--	--	A typographical error here apparently: The Chapter is labelled "V".
171 & 172	--	--	Appear as part of Chapter VII. It appears that V was intended to read VIII.
171	--	--	What happened to the patrol group consisting of San Juan, Hobart, Buchanan and Mohssen? Australia is included in total of 6 CA.
172	--	--	I question some of these strength and weakness factors, e.g., did the Japs actually have more combat experience? Strength & Weakness factors - this might be discussed.
172	--	--	In some respects the fact that Allied ships had radar turned out to be a weakness factor instead of a strength factor. Another weakness factor was that Allied Search Aircraft could not search at night. Radar scopes, as we have them today, were not available in August 1942 and even today it is the exception rather than the rule to find either a radar set or an operator that can accurately provide information of a target in a heavy rain squall sufficient for accurate tracking of that target.

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CHAPTER IX

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
174	Last two paragraphs	--	I question these.
175	--	9	Add diagram no._____.
178	--	4	Jap CA's were within radar range of TALBOT.

General:

On diagram "Japanese Approach Past Radar Pickets" time of 0153 when CHOKAI sights BLUE should be 0053.

CHAPTER X

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
180	--	9	Add diagram no._____.
181	--	12	Add diagram no._____.
181	--	22	Did BLUE have both surface search and air search radars?
182	--	--	"British" misspelled at bottom of page.
182	--	--	It is significant to note that at no time has there been mentioned the possibility that, as a result of the searchplane contacts on the Japanese Forces, CTG 61.1 may have considered it possible that the reported seaplane tenders were converted carriers, or that Japanese carriers were in the vicinity of these forces - but had not been sighted. This, combined with the presence of Japanese Carrier Type planes over the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area no doubt caused CTG 61.1 a great deal of concern. Also, at this stage of the war reports from land-based aircraft were not trusted by shipboard personnel. Since the two contact reports varied considerably as to context, the difference may have been taken into consideration. A fear that enemy carriers were also present could have contributed to CTG 61.1's decision to retire earlier than planned.
183	--	8th line from bottom.	Sentence is superfluous.

CHAPTER XI

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
186	Top of page.	--	Would a torpedo hit be visible, even close aboard, in the middle of the night with overcast and rain squalls?
187	--	7	Add diagram no. ____.
187	--	17	Delete remainder of sentence after "command".
189	--	--	I cannot concur with the first paragraph concerning when torpedoes should be fired. It has always been and still remains good doctrine to, when possible, fire torpedoes before opening fire with guns. This procedure was followed throughout the war and remains in U.S.F. publications today. Typical examples are found in procedures for Destroyer-Cruiser exercises and in the various gunnery practices for these types.
191	--	--	Discussion at top of page seems to be a bit dictatorial.  This discussion is not consistent with that on page 187, middle.
193	1	--	Somewhat conjecture.
195	--	1	Add diagram no. ____.
196	2nd line from bottom.		Is AOBA a flagship?
196	Bottom of page.		Question if the cruiser which Comcrudiv 6 saw was the CHICAGO. If identified as a "London" class ship, it had the characteristic three stack County class silhouette and was, therefore, probably the CANBERRA (a County class cruiser). It would be hard to confuse this class with the

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CHAPTER XI (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
196	Bottom of page.		CHICAGO. Note on p. 197 the accuracy of identification by the Japs. Also on p. 198 Comcrufor identified the CANBERRA as a KENT class cruiser.
196	--	--	Change "Port his rudder" to "change course to the right," or "right rudder," etc.
197	--	16	Add diagram no. ____.

CHAPTER XII

200a.	2	--	2nd sentence - I question this.
202	--	13	Add diagram no. ____.
204	2	--	The reason given here is just not plausible.
205	--	--	Seems to be quibbling over minutes.
208 & 209	--	--	Repetitions - Should be rewritten.
209	--	--	Delete first two words and "in the".
209	--	--	The wounding of the C.O. and Gunnery Officer of the CANBERRA is mentioned three times in previous three pages.
211	--	14	Add diagram no. ____.
211	--	22	Was this in fact a torpedo and if so when and by what ship fired.
211	8th line from bottom.		CANBERRA 600 yards from the CHICAGO at 0147 $\frac{1}{2}$ . P. 214, line 14 shows CANBERRA bearing 045, distance 1200 yards at about 0147 (She commenced turning to port at about 0146 $\frac{1}{2}$ (p.213).

CHAPTER XII (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
213	--	--	Too many conjectures about the reactions of the C.O. of the CHICAGO.
214	--	11	Should "Tulagi" be "Guadalcanal"?
215	--	21	Add diagram no. ____.
218	--	9-11	Star shells could have been obscured by the heavy cloud or rain squall.
219	--	7	Add diagram no. ____.
220	--	5	Insert "of the" between "protection" and "objective".
223	--	22	Add diagram no. ____.
225	--	3	Should "easterly" be "westerly"? Also about firing to port in the next few lines?
225	2nd line from bottom.		Diagram does not indicate PATTERSON was on course 090° T.
225a	--	--	Detailed description of what constituted Condition II. This has been discussed more generally several times before and here seems superfluous and too detailed.
225a	Note 2, last line.		Incomplete.
229	--	--	Is there supporting evidence that the ASTORIA saw nothing?
231	--	2	Add diagram no. ____.
232	Top of page.		Was the TBS outlet on the bridge?
236	Last sentence.		See no need for this last sentence.
236a.	5th line from bottom.		Does the approximate position of a red glow fix accurately the

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CHAPTER XII (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
236a.	5th line from bottom.		position of the CHICAGO group at this time?
236d.	Last sentence.		Does not seem to prove the desired point.
236F	1	--	He may have assumed that it was then too late to do anything about a contact that old (1½ hours).
236G	Last sentence		Add distance and bearing.

CHAPTER XIII

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
239	--	33	Add diagram no. ____.
240	Top of page.		"Probably" should be changed to "or perhaps."
241	1	Last sentence.	Should be deleted as this is pure conjecture, since there is no note concerning excerpts from a diary or other source to show that this was the case. If there is such substantiating evidence, an indication should be made to that effect.
242	--	10	Should the word "competent" be used here in view of no long range sightings by lookouts.
250	--	7	Change "his" to "her".
254a	--	--	Not clear - confused.
254(c)	--	5	"effected" should be "affected".
254-254(C)	--	--	Did the Jap know the way was clear to the transports? He did know that he was in the midst of enemy forces including what he believed to be a probable battleship. Was

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CHAPTER XIII (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
254-254(c)	--	--	he not attempting to disengage in the presence of possible superior forces? I question "What a lack of decision!".
254(c)	--	11 & 12	"What a lack of decision" does not seem to prove anything. It is entirely conjecture. Also, next paragraph seems to be questionable. Was there a recording quartermaster? When and where were allied shot and shell landing in the vicinity of the records?
254(c)	--	11 & 12	Could it be that - instead of "lack of decision" - this commander was steering various courses to confuse return fire or to avoid possible torpedoes? This bears investigation.
254d	--	5 & 6	YUBARI and TENRYU appear to have been in column on course 110° (bad wording).
255	--	14	Add diagram no. ____.
255	--	--	Discussion of the relative positions of the FURUTAKA and TENRYU does not seem too logical.
257	--	--	It may have been CANBERRA instead of BAGLEY.
258	--	24	Add diagram no. ____.
260	2	--	Would the Jap be apt to see a torpedo hole in the Jarvis at night?
261	Top of page.		I question this reasoning.
260 & 261	--	--	The action of the YUNAGI and the JARVIS seems to presuppose a great deal.

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CHAPTER XIV

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
262-269	--	--	The tactical lesson indicated in these pages seems sound, but it is cloaked in too much conjecture as to what the Commander VINCENNES Group was thinking.
264-269	--	--	I believe that this discussion of courses of action would be stronger if it were presented as a post-operation analysis of what might have been rather than in the tone of what the C.O. VINCENNES should have been thinking about.
264	2	--	Did the C.O., VINCENNES actually do this thinking?
270	--	1 & 2	QUINCY and ASTORIA may not have been on that frequency.
270	--	10	This sentence not necessary and contributes nothing.
270	3	last line	Communications was not entirely at fault - this is a personal error of the Commander. This should be rewritten as follows: "what a Commentary on Allied failure to properly employ available communications," (or an equivalent statement.)
270-280	--	--	Considering the fact that the VINCENNES was being hit continuously, it would seem that the factors of time and damage should be given more weight.
272	--	24	Add diagram no._____.
273	--	5	Change "riggings" to "rigging" (?)
275	2nd sentence		I question this. This 1st paragraph is inconsistent with the 2nd one.

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CHAPTER XIV (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
278	--	15	Change "mental processes" to "reactions" or some equivalent expression.
279	bottom of page		From the indicated condition of the ship, how could it steer any course?
280	4th line (et seq.)		This does not seem to add much to the analysis.
281	--	3	"0157" should be "0147".
281-286	--	--	It is considered that too much is made of the C.O., QUINCY asking the Officer-of-the-Deck which way he could turn.
281-291e	--	--	In view of the sentence beginning in the 4th line, page 284, it strikes me that this section on what went through the C.O. QUINCY's mind is excessive.
284	--	20	Do not concur in the statement commencing with - "It is apparent....." There is no direct evidence that the reactions of the C.O. at this particular instant were due to fear of the presence of submarines - else why would he turn on recognition lights in the suspected presence of enemy submarines? If the statement were changed to - "It is possible.....", it would be more acceptable to the reader unless there is more evidence to support the original statement.
284	--	21	Delete "Therefore."
285	--	16	Do not feel that this statement is completely acceptable. (See related comments above with regard to page 284.)

C

CHAPTER XIV (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
287	--	14	Add diagram no. ____
290	--	11-18 incl.	How about giving the C.O. some credit for at least a partially correct decision here.
291b	--	10	Add diagram no. ____.
291d	--	10	Do not believe it possible for C.O. to have known of torpedo hit on VINCENNES, - due to darkness, smoke, confusion plus the fact even if "seen," a torpedo hit might have been attributed to the landing of a salvo of shells.
292-309	--	--	The section on the ASTORIA action needs careful review. Some of the conclusions do not seem justified to me.
294	--	21	"drawsy" should be "drowsy".
297	Bottom of page.		I question this: "he must have been thoroughly familiar ....".
297-298	--	--	The comments about the quartermaster sounding the "General Alarm" are considered to be out of place in this analysis. It would seem that the broad point to be considered here is that none of the ships were at general quarters at 0150.
298	Last.	--	"had he not already rec'd word to standby" etc., might add "or misunderstanding" etc.
298-299	--	--	I question the criticism of the quartermaster in this situation. On p. 297, it is stated that the order "Standby the general alarm" had been given, and the QM could

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CHAPTER XIV (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
298-299	--	--	just as well have been commended for initiative.
299	--	--	Under the conditions stated, I do not concur with the paragraph ending at the top of page 299. There are indications pointing to a very confused condition on the bridge of this ship in the few minutes before 0153 $\frac{1}{2}$ when Japanese salvos began landing near the ASTORIA and other ships nearby. It appears very likely that some one or more persons on the navigation bridge or signal bridge of the ASTORIA saw a salvo land near or they may even have recognized enemy ships firing in their direction. It may be that the quartermaster of the watch saw a salvo land nearby even before the one that landed at 0153 $\frac{1}{2}$ which page 302, lines 7-9 states was the KAKO's fourth salvo. Likewise CHOKAI's fourth salvo hit the ASTORIA in the paint locker at 0154, i.e. page 302, lines 10-14. The order to "Standby" could have been misunderstood. Criticism could be made concerning the order to "Standby the General Alarm", which order in itself should not be necessary on a well run bridge. Page 292 states that salvos had landed near the ASTORIA as early as 0151. This part is all quite confusing to me.
309	8th line from bottom.		I question this.
309	--	--	This is just a reaction at this point, but why not take a ship through the action before taking up another? There's a lot of jumping around and back and forth

CHAPTER XIV (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
309	--	--	in this analysis at this point. Mental somersaults are necessary in order to follow the action.
309-312	--	--	HELM "must have thought...", etc. If so, I believe that his reactions would have been different.
310	--	11 & 15	Not completely understood when taken together.
310	--	16	"Probably" is too positive a word here.
311	--	--	Readers comment only -- Here is evidence of the lack of training of a C.O. as a group or section commander - or it shows the necessity for the presence of a Flag Officer and his Staff.
311	Last.	--	"Confused".
314	Bottom line.		"which seems probable" should be separated from the first clause of the sentence - either by a dash, or a comma.
314	Last.	--	"the old story of too many sight-seers".
317	Top of page.		Why do that?
318	--	15	Add diagram no. ____.
321	Top of page.		I question this.
322	--	21	Add diagram no. ____.
323	--	16	Add diagram no. ____.
323	--	--	This sentence is turned around and therefore, not very readable. Why not ".....with her engineering plant stopped, but with way on caused from steaming at full speed just before this time."

CHAPTER XIV (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
327	Bottom para.	--	"..must have been torn between two courses of action." On p.328, a third course of action which was adopted, is approved. This is inconsistent.
327	--	11	This sentence should be deleted. Cause of gyro failure is unknown - the use of "probably" is questioned.
328	--	2	Agree to the use of a parallel case but it would be better to note the similarity rather than to say that perhaps the C.O. "remembered" this phase of activity at Jutland.
329	--	12	"observed" should read "obscured".

CHAPTER XV

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
334	--	3-7	Could well be omitted.
334	--	8	I question 33,000 yard torpedoes.
337	Bottom of page.		Last sentence: Do not see that "realization" of the difference between estimated and actual ranges is particularly pertinent. It might be better to say that by his claim, the C.O. shows that his original range estimate was considerably short.
338	--	2	"althoughafire" should be "although afire."
338	--	5	The statement that the movement of the QUINCY was "accidental" is not in accord with the quoted statement of the C.O. on page 365 - "we are going through the middle - Give them hell!"

CHAPTER XV (Cont'd)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
338	--	14-16	Rewrite entire sentence.
341	--	--	"Must have thought" reasoning - I question this. Note the Commander's own reasoning at the time beginning with the 7th line from the bottom.
342	2	--	I question the "definite negative"- for could not the carriers now have had the contact and have been hurrying to the scene? This was a definite capability and perhaps this was what the Japanese Commander was thinking of at this time.
342-344	--	--	Does this discussion attribute a clearer picture of the situation to the Japanese Commander than actually existed?
343	--	22	"cruticized" - ("criticized").
345	--	19	Add diagram no.____.
348	Middle of Page	--	Am unable to find other reference to Tenryu engaging a Kent class cruiser (here identified as the QUINCY).
349	--	5	Add diagram no.____.
351	--	21	Add diagram no.____.
352	--	18	Add diagram no.____.

## CHAPTER XVI

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
357	Bottom para.	--	I question this.
361	Bottom half of page.		Was the damage to the VINCENNES, in fact, uncontrollable?
363	--	12	Add diagram no. ____.
365	--	--	"must have realized ...." more of this.
370	--	2	Should this be left?
371a	--	2	I question the wording "happened to be sound", implying that the soundness was a matter of chance.
371b,c	--	--	What steps were taken to determine and localize the damage?
372	--	2	Add diagram no. ____.
373	--	4	Add diagram no. ____.
373	--	10 & 14	Add diagram no. ____.
373	--	--	Note for **** missing.
374	--	16	Add diagram no. ____.
376	1	--	Think "Five" minutes notice for boilers is more in the nature of hindsight. It would seem reasonable to <u>expect</u> sufficient warning for 10 or 15 minutes notice. However, had each C.O. given the Japanese force the <u>capability</u> of attacking, they <u>probably</u> would have had <u>all</u> boilers on the line!
377	--	10	This is the first reference to the "War College Plot" that I have noticed.
377	2	--	Delete "War College".



CHAPTER XVI (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
378	--	Last 2 lines.	Why could he no longer return the fire? (See page 381, 2nd paragraph).
380	--	--	There is no indication of underwater damage affecting the watertight integrity of the ship.
382	2	--	Searchlight or lightning flash? Perhaps this incident did not occur at exactly 0200.
382	--	22	Delete "once again\$.
384	2	--	Despatch was in code, not authenticated, etc. See lines 1 & 2, pages 330c and 398.
386	--	11	Add diagram no. ____.
388	2	--	I wonder if the C.O. of the WILSON attempted to contact his group commander? Perhaps he did and was unsuccessful.
393	1	--	States that Patterson could not see the Jap gun flashes. The 2nd paragraph indicates that she did.
397	6th line from bottom.		I question this.
397a	--	9 & 10	I question westerly, believe they were headed northwest.
397c	--	Last.	Sentence incomplete.
397c	--	--	RALPH TALBOT torpedo firing, diagram is not in agreement with text.
398	2	--	I question this.

CHAPTER XVII

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
401	4th line from bottom.		Could only make 20 knots? I question this.
402	2	--	The decision, if it is considered in the light of his position at that time, was correct. However, it must not be forgotten that he apparently lost sight of his real objective earlier when he continued to engage the cruisers instead of proceeding to accomplish the destruction of the shipping off Tulagi and Guadalcanal.
403	--	14	Add diagram no._____.
406	Top	--	Tropical twilight lasts for not over one hour.
408	1	--	A minor point - do not believe the Japanese "trust to Divine Providence." Perhaps a reference to Shinto gods or the emperor would be more appropriate.
412	--	1 & 2	If there were no Allied submarines in the area it <u>was</u> a false contact. See also page 413, lines 5 and 6.

CHAPTER XVIII

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
414-416	--	--	Not in agreement as to number of search planes sent at this time.
419	--	4	Insert "ships" after "latter."
421	(d)	--	In preceding chapters much stress is placed on the Jap objective being the Allied transports, and action with combat ships was an error on the Jap Commander's part.
421	Middle of Page		Strikes me as inconsistent with the reasoning presented during the course of the battle.
423	--	--	Change associated diagram, changing I-123 to I-122.

CHAPTER XIX

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
423a	--	--	Change "XVIII" to "XIX".
424	--	--	Change "XVIII" to "XIX".
425	Middle of Page		Did the C.O. CHICAGO realize this?
425	--	12	There is no justification shown for the statement "He realized..." If this were prefaced by "Perhaps," it would be a better statement.
428	--	--	(Battle lesson) identification!
430-431	--	--	There was a considerable waste of ammunition on CANBERRA when well-aimed torpedoes would have done the job.
434	--	12-14	I question this.
437	--	--	Patterson - check - fired - no torpedoes - why?
444	--	13	Delete "therefore".
445	Top	--	From this account an analysis of the failure of the Astoria's damage control organization seems in order.
452	--	16	TALBOT fired torpedoes not shown on diagram.
455	--	2-5	I question this.
455	2	--	Reference to the Battle of Jutland does not strike me as being germane.

CHAPTER XIX (Cont'd.)

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
455	Middle of Page		The comparison of the situation to that at Jutland is applicable, but to say that the Admiral "probably remembered" certain incidents is a little too far-fetched. An out-and-out comparison would be more acceptable from the reader's point of view.
456	--	--	(Communications) (VINCENNES)  At 0153 $\frac{1}{2}$ VINCENNES lost inter-ship communications and to quote lines 13 to 16, "Failing to communicate with the VINCENNES, CTG 62.6 endeavored to communicate with the ASTORIA and QUINCY but he was unable to raise them for similar reasons." This is not consistent with several other statements in the book where this failure is not considered when discussing the actions of the VINCENNES, QUINCY, and ASTORIA.
457	--	15	Sentence should be omitted.
458	--	--	No justification is shown for remarks as to CTG 62.6's feelings. If this information was taken from CTG 62.6's letters or reports, it should be so stated. Otherwise, this page should be rewritten.
459	--	18	"reciphered" should be "enciphered" and "signal cypher in force" should be quoted or the American equivalent - "signal cipher in effect" should be used.
461	3	--	Here is some of the justification for statements made on page 458. Page 458 should also refer to this justification in some manner, as a matter of fact some of the information on page 461 could be combined with that on page 458, thus allowing some condensation.

~~SECRET~~

CHAPTER XX

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
472	--	--	Change Chapter "XIX" to Chapter "XX".
473	--	10-14	I question this.
478	--	2	I question this.
484	3	--	This information has been repeated several times in the book.
485	2nd line from bottom.		Better to say: "possibly about as follows".
486.	--	4	"probably" should be inserted before "felt." This whole paragraph consists of statements which are not supported by footnotes as to source, etc.
489-490	Bottom of 489 and top of 490.		I question this. In fact, a 30 minute delay in acting from the receipt of Comsopacfor message to a course change seems reasonable to me.
493	Next to last sentence.		Not understood. Should this be "enemy commanders.."?
496	--	13	"CTG 61.1"
497	--	--	Add Diagram no. ____.
499	--	2	What "same time"? - "0740"?
502	--	--	I don't see what the details of these flight operations have to do with Savo.
510	--	10	Instead of "presently available," substitute "extent."

~~SECRET~~

0242

THE EFFECT OF THE BATTLE

<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Comment</u>
4	--	--	"Effect of the Battle":- What about stressing the fact that this battle was incidental to our <u>first</u> offensive amphibious operation of the War! Even though land opposition to the assault was initially quite light, the islands were occupied by the enemy. Consolidation of the land mass seized was much more difficult. I believe it is important to bring out the fact that all U.S. Amphibious Operations were 100% successful as a whole, and this was the first in a long series of successful amphibious operations.

BATTLE LESSONS

<u>Lesson Number</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1	Concur -- This landing paid off amply - thus fully justifying the calculated risk.
2	Concur -- Except that the last two sentences in the first paragraph of page 503 should be deleted.
3	Concur -- but not fully. It could be logical, later on in a campaign or war, to use the same command set up under similar or other conditions more favorable to the same stationing of the Commander. However, it will never be sound to use this arrangement early in a campaign or war such as was done in this case. Too many untrained people in authority are involved and too many best guesses are used in planning for early operations. Later on, months or years later, methods, experiences, doctrines, etc. are more firmly set and can relieve a commander of many details.

BATTLE LESSONS (Cont'd.)

Lesson Number

Comment

3

I think this depends upon who is meant by "Commander Expeditionary Force". I believe Admiral Spruance was thinking of himself as Commander WesPac Task Forces. If so, Admiral Turner was Com Jex at the objective in an AGC.

3

Note: June 1st 1942 is questioned.

4

Do Not Concur -

not that the "principle of the objective" should be neglected or forgotten but that there is such a thing as a "COMMAND DECISION" which temporarily may require a departure from a commander's objective. In this case, it is submitted that one or all of the following justified the departure:

(a) The Japanese commander had received reports of an entirely different set of forces in the area including a battleship. When he encountered a second group of heavy cruisers, the VINCENNES Group, he knew that the reported number of operational defending surface units was in error. This was particularly pertinent when destroyers were reported to him as cruisers.

(b) The ever present possibility that after nightfall the transports would complete unloading and withdraw. It must be remembered that the number of U.S. Marines and the gear that they had with them exceeded by ten fold the highest estimates made by the Japanese. At this stage of hostilities in the Pacific, the Japanese consistently underestimated the Allied strength and capabilities.

BATTLE LESSONS (Cont'd.)

<u>Lesson Number</u>	<u>Comment</u>
4	I question this.
5	Concur -- The Japanese were always "under estimators".
5	Second page - bottom line -- place "enemy" between "previous" and "losses."
5	Did Comcrufor sink the JARVIS?
6	Concur.
7	Concur.
7	I wonder what "important navies" use enemy intentions?
8	What about the conditions of readiness of the "AUSTRALIA"?
8	Concur.
9	Concur -- This one is excellent.
10	Bottom - line 2 - Insert "sea" before "area". Otherwise, we precipitate an argument with the Air Force. Perhaps "sea area" should be defined so as to include islands or small land masses.
10	Concur.-- and add after word "trained" -- "and suitably disposed".
11	While communications are covered in the discussion, they are omitted from the battle lesson. The Commander should also have operational control over all communications. Communications should be covered - either in this "lesson" or in a separate "discussion" and "lesson". The latter solution is believed more suitable.
11	Not necessarily "operational control" but at least "direct communications"



BATTLE LESSONS (Cont'd.)

<u>Lesson Number</u>	<u>Comment</u>
11	with bases, aircraft on missions or other means to reliably insure immediate receipt of all "contact reports, etc."
12	Concur -- It could be added that a senior commander should always receive and be obligated to study or change any plan of his immediate juniors. In this case, additional night air searches should have been undertaken. There seems to be no excuse for search planes were available and certainly the situation justified their use. Going a step further, cruiser planes should also have been used to search entrances and approaches thereto prior to darkness.
13	Concur.
13	Voice transmissions used were limited in range. In urgent situations Commanders must use CW or intermediate range voice transmissions as necessary to reach all units involved.
14	Concur -- but this lesson may well be combined with lesson 13.
15	Concur.
16	Concur.
17	Concur -- but this lesson could be combined with one or more of the lower numbered lessons.
18	Do not concur -- This difference in night performance was mainly due to deficiencies in the various Allied units and group commanders. It is axiomatic that no state of training, however, excellent, can overcome the serious deficiencies

BATTLE LESSONS (Cont'd.)

Lesson Number

Comment

- |    |   |
|----|---|
| 18 | in leadership that existed in the covering forces. Apparently little advanced thought was given to such a contingency either during the planning period or the period of movement to the objective area.  |
| 19 | Concur -- It should be added that training from top to bottom (Naval War College down) did little if anything to encourage individual thought and thinking. Although many ships had game boards, only a very few used them. It may be that the Japanese game of "GO" has merit. Fleet units were always granted time for all types and kinds of training except that type that instilled and trained naval officers to think. This to a certain extent is still true today. |
| 20 | Concur.   |

BATTLE LESSONS (Cont'd)

Special Note:

Subject to the foregoing comments, the battle lessons are considered excellent. However, there are several additional lessons which should be covered, as follows:

(1) The Theater Commander must have operational control over all communications and insure that provision is made for the rapid and efficient delivery of important messages. Communications constitute a function of command and the efficiency of the command will suffer if communications are misused or slighted.

(2) Damage control training was poor as evidenced in several ships by the failure to inform the C.O. as to the extent of damage and the corrective measures in progress. Also, in several instances spaces were abandoned without informing those in authority of such action. The follow-up and investigation of damage sustained was inadequate. Moreover, the actual control of damage was generally weak, showing a lack of realistic training.

(3) The importance of identification at night was indicated throughout this book. The incorrect use of emergency identification procedure was indicative of unpreparedness in this procedure.

(4) The importance of maintaining a mobile logistic support force at a reasonable distance in order to conduct sustained combat operations, was highlighted. Had there been a logistic rendezvous to the South or Southwest of Guadalcanal, one carrier (with sufficient escort) could have fueled at a time while the other carriers remained in the vicinity of the objective to insure that control of the air was maintained. Thus, the transports need not have departed the scene precipitously without landing all the necessary materials for the Landing Force.

COMBAT APPRAISAL  
of the  
JAPANESE CRUISER FORCE COMMANDER  
Vice Admiral GUNICHI MIKAWA

In line two (2), how can we be sure air power caused him to make unsound decisions?

Appraisal of Admiral Mikawa -- I don't understand what point is served by singling out this officer for appraisal.

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